Islamism: Sharp Increase in Number of House Searches and Arrests

This is justified by a significant increase in the threat posed by violent Islamists. The number of house searches and arrests in this area has more than doubled since 2022 and has continued to rise since then.

Since 2022, there have been over 150 house searches conducted in the Islamist or jihadist milieu, the DSN announced on Thursday. 56 individuals were arrested by state protection. Last year alone, security authorities were made aware of 215 criminal acts with an Islamist or jihadist motive. In 2023, there were still 152. This represents an increase of more than 40 percent.

650 People Under Surveillance

The number of dangerous individuals residing in Austria in the realm of Islamist extremism or terrorism is currently in the low triple digits. This includes individuals who, according to the DSN, are assumed to be ready to use violence or carry out attacks at any time. Overall, there are currently 650 people in Austria being monitored by the constitutional protection in the area of Islamist extremism and terrorism, as DSN Director Omar Haijawi-Pirchner revealed on Tuesday evening in "Zib 2".

Last year, a total of 845 tips were received by the DSN's Extremism and Terrorism Reporting Office. These were subjected to a "coordinated processing," according to the constitutional protectors.

DSN Wants Three-Stage Model

"The threat of Islamist terrorism has become increasingly present over the past years, and the challenges for constitutional protection in combating it have grown ever larger. In view of these developments and the current threat landscape, it is more important than ever for Austria to strengthen its investigative competencies and thus be able to carry out threat prevention with its own means," stated DSN Director Haijawi-Pirchner on Thursday. He therefore wants to implement a three-stage model to effectively counter threats. In a press release issued on Thursday, it was stated in this context that the police are fighting in the digital space "with muskets" - such as the means of telephone surveillance and opening letters against "fully automatic machine guns" like AI-supported algorithms, end-to-end encrypted chat channels, and "tidal waves of toxic content".

The first step of this three-stage model involves automated internet screening. The freely accessible "Clear Web" and social media are searched for suspicious content using special software - so-called internet crawlers. As the daily growing mass of data can no longer be managed by officers, modern constitutional protection agencies are turning to the possibilities of digitalization. Appropriate programs can check platforms for radical content in seconds and identify consumers of this content. Public areas are scanned based on specific search parameters. In this first phase, for example, a fundamental radicalization of a particular user can be detected.

Noticed on TikTok Profile

It was with this exact method that German investigators became aware of the 14-year-old from Vienna and his TikTok profile, who is suspected of having planned a terrorist attack on the Vienna Westbahnhof. He is said to have spread radical Islamist ideology via TikTok and endorsed IS content, which brought him into the focus of neighboring intelligence services due to certain search terms. The TikTok profile was relatively quickly linked to the student from Vienna-Währing, and subsequently, the DSN ordered and conducted a house search, which led to the 14-year-old being taken into pre-trial detention as a suspected IS supporter with terrorist plans.

The three-step model envisions covert investigations by professional staff in the second step. They have access to content from the so-called deep web and infiltrate chats and forums of relevant, dangerous groups. These investigators, for example, read along when Islamist ideology is endorsed and there is a concrete IS connection and thus potential threats. These communication groups are usually broad and large enough for the undercover investigator to operate without being detected.

In the end - in the third phase - according to Haijawi-Pirchner's vision for the DSN, it should finally be possible to read the encrypted communication of so-called high-risk threats. Currently, it is not allowed to continue monitoring individuals who come into the focus of intelligence services in phase two if they switch to an encrypted messenger service. They can discuss and exchange their plans undisturbed there because there is no authority for intelligence services to read on messenger services. From the DSN's perspective, this is not justifiable to the public and the victims of attacks.

"In No Way Mass Surveillance"

However, the DSN director considers this targeted messenger surveillance, restricted to specific and certain individuals, to be indispensable as soon as suspects identified through covert investigations move their communication to encrypted, private channels. This messenger surveillance targets specific high-risk threats and their communication. It is "in no way mass surveillance," which would also not be compatible with the rule of law, emphasized Haijawi-Pirchner.

The FPÖ rejects the demands of the DSN director. "Although he himself had to admit that the messenger service surveillance, drummed up by the ÖVP and himself, would neither have prevented the Islamist terrorist attack in Villach nor contributed to the arrest of the suspected jihadist with attack plans on the Vienna Westbahnhof, the DSN director and former ÖVP campaign helper continues to drum up the black mass surveillance fantasies against his own population," said the FPÖ General Secretary Christian Hafenecker in a statement. A "greater admission of the complete failure of the ÖVP in the Ministry of the Interior and in security policy" could "hardly be made." The messenger service surveillance would neither stop Islamist hate preachers on TikTok nor alert authorities to the open dissemination of Islamist content on TikTok. Hafenecker reiterated the FPÖ's demand for a prohibition law against political Islam.

In the investigations against the 14-year-old arrested on February 10 in Vienna-Währing, the evaluation of the data carriers is not yet complete, said a spokesman for the Ministry of the Interior on Thursday in response to an APA inquiry. Only after the completion of this investigation step can answers to further questions be provided - such as exactly where on TikTok the youth was radicalized and whether he was in contact with other jihadists.

(APA/Red)

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